Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “xisφing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “xisφing” is true when what is happening withxis such that, if it is not interrupted, a φing will occur. It then applies (...) itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when “xisφing” describesx's intentional action, it is true iffxis acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to φ, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will φ. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon‐copier example Donald Davidson gives in “Intending” fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is φing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies. (shrink)

Abstract:This article sets out two central theses. Both theses primarily involve a fundamental criticism of current contractarian business ethics (CBE), but if these can be sustained, they also constitute two boundary conditions for any future contractarian theory of business ethics. The first, which I label the self-discipline thesis, claims that current CBE would gain considerably in focus if more attention were paid to the logic of the social contract argument. By this I mean the aims set by the theorist and (...) method of reasoning by which normative conclusions are drawn in the contract model. The second, to which I refer as the domain-specificity thesis, argues that current CBE needs to be better adapted to its field of application and the specific goals which it aims to establish. I will substantiate these two theses on the basis of a comparative analysis of CBE with two earlier families of social contract theories. (shrink)

_Return to the Kingdom of Childhood: Re-envisioning the Legacy and Philosophical Relevance of Negritude_ examines the philosophy of Negritude through an innovative analysis of Léopold Sédar Senghor’s oeuvre. In the first book-length study of Senghorian philosophy, Cheikh Thiam argues that Senghor’s work expresses an Afri-centered conception of the human while simultaneously offering a critique of the Western universalization of “man.” Senghor’s corrective, descriptive, and prescriptive theory of humanness is developed through a conception of race as a cultural manifestation of (...) being. Thiam contends that Senghor’s conception of race entails an innovative Afri-centered epistemology and ontology. For Senghor, races are the effects of particular groups’ relations to the world. The so-called “Negroes,” for example, are determined by their epistemology based on their fluid understanding of the ontological manifestations of being. The examination of this ontology and its ensuing epistemology, which is constitutive of the foundation of Senghor’s entire oeuvre, indicates that Negritude is a postcolonial philosophy that stands on its own. The hermeneutics of Senghor’s race theory show that the Senegalese thinker’s pioneering postcolonial philosophy remains relevant in the postcolonial era. In fact, it questions and expands the works of major contemporary African-descended scholars such as Paul Gilroy, Edouard Glissant, and Molefi Asante. Thiam’s approach is thoroughly interdisciplinary, combining perspectives from philosophy, literary analysis, anthropology, and postcolonial, African, and cultural studies. (shrink)

Cheikh Moctar Ba avait, dans un précédent traité, défini et constitué un parallèle entre les cosmogonies et les cosmologies grecques et africaines. Il entreprend ici une analyse de la fonction et de la place qu'elles occupent dans la vie des sociétés, et comment elles sont à l'origine de l'établissement d'un certain ordre. Face à ces problématiques qui regroupent en grande partie les questionnements du mouvement existentiel, il s'attèle à construire cet essai autour deux axes principaux: une étude de la (...) question de la centralité, et un examen du rapport entretenu par les cosmologies et les cosmogonies avec les différentes formes d'organisation sociale. (shrink)

This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose resistance to causal/functional individuation stems from their possession of individuative historical properties. But if qualia cannot be causally or functionally individuated, then qualia can (...) be physically realized only if the thesis that all things are physical or physically realized is insufficient for physicalism. (shrink)

Résumé Il est question de voir, à travers l’étude de certaines positions philosophiques de Marcien Towa en quoi l’activité philosophique est une expérience de liberté, une conscience active, en mouvement. En effet, chez Marcien Towa, la liberté est le résultat d’un processus de redécouverte de soi qui anime le sujet conscient de son être-là dans le monde. Le dévoilement de l’essence du moi est une nécessité voire un impératif dont l’effectivité est le résultat d’une remise en question de l’essence du (...) moi qui renaît de sa déchirure comme un moi objectif, comme une conscience de liberté. C’est en cela qu’il y a réconciliation du moi avec lui-même, l’avènement d’un sujet nouveau capable de se prendre en charge comme entité libre et autonome qui s’assume et qui prend en charge sa destinée. (shrink)

Résumé Il est question de voir, à travers l’étude de certaines positions philosophiques de Marcien Towa en quoi l’activité philosophique est une expérience de liberté, une conscience active, en mouvement. En effet, chez Marcien Towa, la liberté est le résultat d’un processus de redécouverte de soi qui anime le sujet conscient de son être-là dans le monde. Le dévoilement de l’essence du moi est une nécessité voire un impératif dont l’effectivité est le résultat d’une remise en question de l’essence du (...) moi qui renaît de sa déchirure comme un moi objectif, comme une conscience de liberté. C’est en cela qu’il y a réconciliation du moi avec lui-même, l’avènement d’un sujet nouveau capable de se prendre en charge comme entité libre et autonome qui s’assume et qui prend en charge sa destinée. (shrink)

I argue that political activity needs philosophical insights in order to keep pace with some exigencies of the human person, and of the nature of the body of any human community. More specifically, I argue that some ethical and moral principles should be the genuine foundations of the performed acts emanating from the political leader. Drawing mainly from philosophy, I argue that the issue of political leadership is an expressive example in which we encounter the necessity of bringing ethics into (...) the sphere of politics, in order to provide the latter with strong, unshakable, and objective foundations. This also gives me an opportunity to rise against Machiavellianism and its correlates. (shrink)

Ethical Personalism proposes to reflect on the person from at least three levels: ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Articulating the ontological and inalienable value of the human person, i.e., her dignity, from various philosophical and religious angles and traditions, the contributors show not just what it means to be a human person, but also what it takes to live accordingly. Hence, beyond the purely theoretical elaboration on ethical personalism that reposes the crucial debates between relativism and realism on the one hand, (...) and consequentialism and deontology on the other, this volume offers a range of insights useful for addressing concrete and practical matters that we, as humans, are confronted by in our everyday life. Ethical Personalism unequivocally affirms the necessity of (re)placing the person in the centre of our project of society, economic plans, political settings, and environment policies. (shrink)

Der Ausdruck Phänomenologie ist heute höchst vieldeutig geworden. Husserl hat seit 1905 eine immer stärkere Wendung zum Idealismus kantischer Prägung hin vollzogen, durch die er den Boden der Phänomenologie, wie er sie begründet hatte, verlassen hat. Eine ähnliche Abweichung von der ursprünglichen Idee der Phänomenologie findet sich bei vielen anderen "Phänomenologen." Die "realistische Phänomenologie", deren Vorläufer von Platon an und Klassiker von Husserl bis Schwarz in dieser ersten umfangreichen deutschsprachigen Anthologie zu Wort kommen, ist kein System, sondern eine Anwendung der (...) philosophischen Urmethoden, wie sie alle großen Philosophen tatsächlich anwandten, wenn sie ihre entscheidenden Entdeckungen machten. Mögen auch von Philosophen generell andere Methoden bewußt zugrunde gelegt werden, in dem Moment, in dem diese Einsichten gewonnen werden, liegt tatsächlich zu allen Zeiten jener letzte, fruchtbare Kontakt mit "den Sachen selbst" vor, der den Sinn der phänomenologischen Methode ausmacht, wie sie von den Meistern der realistischen Phänomenologie nur bewußter und systematischer angewandt wird als von vielen früheren Denkern. Nichts wäre darum irriger als in der phänomenologischen Betrachtungsweise eine Reduktion der Welt auf bloße "Phänomene" zu erblicken oder gar eine bloße Deskription der "Erscheinung" der Dinge. Zwischen phänomenologischer Betrachtungsweise und metaphysischer Wesensanalyse besteht kein Unterschied oder gar Gegensatz. (shrink)

This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence (...) that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well. (shrink)

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)

In this groundbreaking new study, Ben Ware carries out a bold reassessment of the relationship between modernism and ethics, arguing that modernist literature and philosophy offer more than simply a snapshot of the moral conflicts of the past: they provide a crucial point of reference for today's emancipatory struggles. Modernism in this assessment is characterized not only by a concern with language and aesthetic creativity, but also by a preoccupation with the question of how to live. Investigating ethical ideas in (...) Wittgenstein, Beckett, Kierkegaard, Kant, Cavell, Marx, Henry James and Lacan, Ware demonstrates how these thinkers can bring us to a new understanding of a constellation of issues which contemporary radical thought must re-visit: utopia, repetition, perfectionism, subtraction, negativity, critique, absence, duty, revolution and political love. The result is a timely and provocative intervention, which re-draws the boundaries for future debates on the ethics and politics of modernism. (shrink)

I develop a formal logic in which quantified arguments occur in argument positions of predicates. This logic also incorporates negative predication, anaphora and converse relation terms, namely, additional syntactic features of natural language. In these and additional respects, it represents the logic of natural language more adequately than does any version of Frege’s Predicate Calculus. I first introduce the system’s main ideas and familiarize it by means of translations of natural language sentences. I then develop a formal system built on (...) these principles, the Quantified Argument Calculus or Quarc. I provide a truth-value assignment semantics and a proof system for the Quarc. I next demonstrate the system’s power by a variety of proofs; I prove its soundness; and I comment on its completeness. I then extend the system to modal logic, again providing a proof system and a truth-value assignment semantics. I proceed to show how the Quarc versions of the Barcan formulas, of their converses and of necessary existence come out straightforwardly invalid, which I argue is an advantage of the modal Quarc over modal Predicate Logic as a system intended to capture the logic of natural language. (shrink)

Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i.e. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. Chalmers suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem.” Against this, I argue that work on the meta-problem will likely fail to make the hard problem any easier. For each of the main stances on the hard problem can provide an account of problem reports, (...) and we have no way of deciding which of these accounts gives the correct explanation of an individual’s problem reports without presupposing a stance on the hard problem. We thus cannot determine which of the available solutions to the meta-problem is correct without having already solved the hard problem. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar que el escrito medieval no posee el mismo estatuto ni los mismos valores que hoy en día y, a partir de ahí, reaccionar ante la oposición entre lo oral y lo escrito que se utiliza a propósito de la literatura árabe en sus comienzos. La tesis propuesta defiende que, hasta la segunda mitad, si no hasta el final del siglo III de la Hégira, los textos de adab, aunque compuestos y producidos por escrito, (...) lo habían sido en la idea de que su circulación, su comunicación y recepción se haría, en la mayor parte de los casos, oralmente. Es este fenómeno el que define el estatus del adab de sus «autores», y de la naturaleza de las obras que lo constituyen. (shrink)

Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic, that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two (...) uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la sección de la recopilación de adab del 'Iqd al-farid de Ibn 'Abd Rabbih llamada "El Libro de Lamentaciones, Condolencias y Elegías". Se analiza la función ideológica del 'Iqd, concretamente la manera en que se organiza el género con ocasión de la muerte. Localiza lo que parece haberse «reprimido» en el texto en un intento por determinar el material que fue pasado por alto, enterrado o alterado, y estudia la organización de sus prioridades. El artículo sostiene que (...) el 'Iqd, en su función de texto ejemplar, no se limita a reflejar una ideología dominante sino que hace una contribución al discurso dominante por su manera de dar forma a la vida intelectual y social. (shrink)

Il s¿agit de poursuivre le travail de relecture du Kiláó al-Buhalá' consmencé dans larticle paru dans le Bulleíin dÉludes Orientales de Damas (LI 1999:"Avarice ou sophistique? Une lecture du Livre des ovares d'al-Gdisig"), travail qui pose que le propos du célébre polygraphe nesí pas tant la critique de lavarice, nu de la gueuserie (lmdya) dans le cas de Halib b. Yazid, que celle du détnumement des discours de leura fnnctions supposées nobles. Dans le récit "autobiographique" el le testament spirituel de (...) Ijálawayh al~MukaddI, ce qui se trouve mimé, parodié pnur étre dénigré, cesí, semble-t-il, la pratique des sermonnaires populaire> (Qu~sás), el, plus généralemení, celle des 'ulamá' qui prétendent éduquer les fonles. Larticle s'attache á analyser les procédés stylistiques et rhétoriques utilisés par al-Óálii~ pour vilipender ces usages dévoyés du discours. (shrink)

Queens, Eunuchs and Concubines in Islamic History, 661–1257. By Taef El-Azhari. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019. Pp. xix + 449. $140, £90.

The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top-down influences, we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking (...) a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus-control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind. (shrink)

Philosophers of logic are particularly interested in understanding the aims, epistemology, and methodology of logic. This raises the question of how the philosophy of logic should go about these enquires. According to the practice-based approach, the most reliable method we have to investigate the methodology and epistemology of a research field is by considering in detail the activities of its practitioners. This holds just as true for logic as it does for the recognised empirical and abstract sciences. If we wish (...) to systematically understand the aims and epistemology of logic, we are best placed achieving this by looking at what logicians do, rather than reflecting upon the nature of logic itself. In this entry, we outline the motivations for a practice-based approach towards the philosophy of logic and highlight its advantages over more “top-down” approaches, which attempt to infer conclusions about the nature of logic and its methodology on the basis of traditional assumptions about knowledge, metaphysics, or logic itself. We end by addressing several prominent concerns raised against the practice-based approach. (shrink)

In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...) showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. (shrink)

While anti-exceptionalism about logic is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there’s still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of certain traditional (...) properties of logic. The picture that results is not of one singular position, but rather a cluster of often connected positions with distinct motivations, understood in terms of their rejection of clusters of the various traditional properties. In order to show the fruitfulness of this new conception of AEL, we distinguish between two prominent versions of the position, metaphysical and epistemological AEL, and show how the two positions need not stand or fall together. (shrink)

An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on the logical structure of intentional action, on the (...) question of whether basic actions are tryings, and on the notion of “options” in decision theory. On the way to these central ideas, we argue that a person can try to do something even if they believe it is impossible that they will succeed, that a person can try to do something even if they do not want to succeed, and that a person can try to do something even if they do not intend to succeed. (shrink)

According to hedonism about well-being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The Experience Machine, and The Resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right (...) motivation for it is the ‘experience requirement’ (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). Next, I argue that hedonists should accept a felt-quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude-based theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity in one’s pleasures. (shrink)

Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a (...) practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism. (shrink)

A puzzling feature of paradigmatic cases of dehumanization is that the perpetrators often attribute uniquely human traits to their victims. This has become known as the “paradox of dehumanization.” We address the paradox by arguing that the perpetrators think of their victims as human in one sense, while denying that they are human in another sense. We do so by providing evidence that people harbor a dual character concept of humanity. Research has found that dual character concepts have two independent (...) sets of criteria for their application, one of which is descriptive and one of which is normative. Across four experiments, we found evidence that people deploy a descriptive criterion according to which being human is a matter of being a Homo sapiens; as well as a normative criterion according to which being human is a matter of possessing a deep-seated commitment to do the morally right thing. Importantly, we found that people are willing to affirm that someone is human in the descriptive sense, while denying that they are human in the normative sense, and vice versa. In addition to providing a solution to the paradox of dehumanization, these findings suggest that perceptions of moral character have a central role to play in driving dehumanization. (shrink)

Theories of phenomenal intentionality have been claimed to resolve certain worries about the indeterminacy of mental content that rival, externalist theories face. Thus far, however, such claims have been largely programmatic. This paper aims to improve on prior arguments in favor of phenomenal intentionality by using attention and Gestalt principles as specific examples of factors that influence the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in ways that thereby help determine perceptual content. Some reasons are then offered for rejecting an alternative interpretation (...) of these examples, according to which the phenomenal effects of attention and Gestalt principles play no role in the determination of perceptual content. (shrink)

What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this article, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life, the view that one's life is meaningful at time t just in case one's surviving at t would be good in some way, and one's life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was made better in some way for one's having existed.

One prominent argument in international law and religious thought for abolishing capital punishment is that it violates individuals’ right to life. Notably, this _right-to-life argument_ emerged from normative and legal frameworks that recognize deadly force against aggressors as justified when necessary to stop their unjust threat of grave harm. Can capital punishment be necessary in this sense—and thus justified defensive killing? If so, the right-to-life argument would have to admit certain exceptions where executions are justified. Drawing on work by Hugo (...) Bedau, I identify a thought experiment where executions are justified defensive killing but explain why they cannot be in our world. A state’s obligations to its prisoners include the _obligation to use nonlethal incapacitation_ (ONI), which applies as long as prisoners pose no imminent threat. ONI precludes executions for reasons of future dangerousness. By subjecting the right-to-life argument to closer scrutiny, this article ultimately places it on firmer ground. (shrink)

I examine the origins of ordinary racial thinking. In doing so, I argue against the thesis that it is the byproduct of a unique module. Instead, I defend a pluralistic thesis according to which different forms of racial thinking are driven by distinct mechanisms, each with their own etiology. I begin with the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race. I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have an important, albeit delimited, role to play in sustaining this (...) belief. I then argue that essentialist beliefs about race are driven by some of the mechanisms responsible for “entitativity perception”: the tendency to perceive some aggregates of people as more genuine groups than others. Finally, I argue that coalitional thinking about race is driven by a distinctive form of entitativity perception. However, I suggest that more data is needed to determine the prevalence of this form of racial thinking. (shrink)

This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta-semantic assumptions about the context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sensitive to the mechanisms of constraint.